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This study compares the information security policy (ISP) compliance of the banking industry between the 
United States and South Korea. The distinctive differences of national culture between both nations has led 
to meaningful findings of ISP compliance at the organizational and individual levels. Drawing on the Cross 
Value Framework (CVF), this study conducted a survey and distributed questionnaires to the banking 
employees in the United States and South Korea. Our analysis results reveal that organizational cultures, 
namely, hierarchical and rational cultures, drive organizational norms in support of ISP compliance in the 
banking sectors in both nations. While organizational cultures demonstrate no direct effect on individual’s 
compliance among the banking employees in the United States, organizational cultures consisting of team, 
rational, and entrepreneurial cultures directly influence individual’s compliance in South Korean banking. 
Accordingly, this study suggests that common industry characteristics play a role in ISP compliance at the 
organizational level and that national culture may act as a moderator in ISP compliance at the individual 
level. 
 
Keywords: Organizational culture, norms, information security policy compliance, banking industry 
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1 Introduction 
Banking industry is a highly regulated industry in that regulations like Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) mandate 
financial institutions to practice standardized financial reporting for upholding ethical conducts. Presently, 
IT governance frameworks provide guidelines to organizations for complying with SOX. Organizations are 
using IT governance frameworks, such as Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 
(COBIT), to align IT security strategies with business/enterprise strategies and to comply with information 
security regulations (Symons 2005). However, these IT governance frameworks are blind to national and 
organizational culture that may improve or impede the enforcement of security policies. The solutions 
outlined in the IT governance frameworks may not work in all cultural settings.  
Given the criticality of culture, there are several studies examining cultures in the Information Systems 
Security (ISS) literatures (Interligi 2010; Smith, Winchester, Bunker and Jamieson 2010; Da Veiga and 
Eloff 2010; Hu, Dinev, Hart and Cooke 2012; Hovav and D’Arcy 2012; Kim, Ryu and Kwark 2013; Rocha 
Flores, Antonsen and Ekstedt 2014). However, there is a lack of study focusing on ISP compliance from 
both the organizational and national perspectives to shed lights on individual-level compliance.  
Therefore, this study intends to (1) investigate the effectiveness of organizational culture and the role of 
national culture on information security policy (ISP) compliance in the banking industry; and (2) provide 
suggestions on how to implement security practices in different cultural settings. Drawing on the Competing 
Values Framework (CVF) (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983), this study assesses organizational culture as a 
predictor for individual compliance and organizational norms supporting ISP compliance. Particularly, this 
study examines how organizational culture in the banks in the United States and South Korea drive ISP 
compliance at the individual and organizational levels.  
Mainly, this study chooses the banking industry as most banks across nations are saddled with regulatory 
pressures that compel banks to comply (Kam, Katerattanakul and Gogolin 2013). Therefore, ISP compliance 
is highly applicable to the banking industry. In addition, this study selects the United States and South Korea 
because their distinctive differences in national culture (Hofstede 1983) will reveal meaningful findings, 
offering suggestions to improve individual and organizational compliance in multiple cultural settings.  
2 Literature Review 
2.1 National Culture: The United States vs. South Korea 
Culture is defined as “the collective mental programming of the people in an environment…it encompasses 
a number of people who were conditioned by the same education and life experience.” (Hofstede 1980, pg. 
43). In other words, culture pertains to a way of thinking, feeling, and acting acquired since early childhood 
(Hofstede 1991). Accordingly, national culture discerns one group of people from another through a 
distinctive set of values, beliefs, and assumptions learned in early childhood (Hofstede 1991). National 
culture is profoundly integrated into everyday life, making it hard to change (Newman and Nollen 1996). 
Hofstede (1983) suggests that the national culture of the United States is defined by high individualism 
(focus on individual welfare), low uncertainty avoidance (risk taking), low power distance (perception that 
superior is equal as oneself), and high masculinity (focus on success and ambition rather than the well-being 
of people and environment). In contrast, the national culture of South Korea is characterized by high 
collectivism (group consciousness), high uncertain avoidance (risk averse), high power distance (perception 
that superior has higher status than oneself), and high masculinity (Hofstede 1983).  
In the organizational context, national culture dictates employees’ understanding of work, their approach to 
work, and the way they want to be treated (Newman and Nollen 1996; Schneider and DeMeyer 1991; 
Straub1994). Given the differences in national culture between the United States and South Korea, this study 
suggests that compliance behavior among banking employees in both nations differ. That is, ISP compliance 
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in each nation is motivated by different factors built on national culture (Hovav and D’Arcy 2012; Kim et. 
al. 2013). 
2.2 Banking Industry 
The distinctive traits of banking culture is hierarchical, bureaucratic, and slow to change (Davis 2004). 
Banks operate in relational systems consisting of a governance unit that monitors banking regulative and 
normative controls (Scott 2008, pg. 186). Mainly, governance units refer to regularized controls organized 
by authorities and legitimate parties (Scott 2008, pg. 186). For example, banks in the United States are 
related to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC). The relational systems (Scott 2008, pg. 85) create a regulatory environment (Park and Weber 2006), 
causing banks to outline formal policies and procedures (Argyris 1958) in organizational settings.  
Banks in the United States and South Korea are facing tremendous pressure to comply with regulations. In 
the United States, after the financial scandal involving Enron and WorldCom, the banking industry has been 
confronting immense pressure to comply with regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, 
which dictates standard accounting and financial reporting. In addition, banks in the United States are 
mandated to abide by Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA), a comprehensive federal law that requires financial 
institutions to develop, implement, and maintain administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for 
defending the security, integrity, and confidentiality of customer information. The pressure to comply has 
compelled U.S. banks to incorporate information security into their daily operations. 
In South Korea, the government re-regulated and restructured the banking industry after the financial crisis 
in 1997-1998 (Park and Weber 2006) to restore confidence in the banking systems (Banker, Chang and Lee 
2010). The regulatory reform has compelled banks to comply with stringent regulations. In addition, the 
Korean government has enacted Personal Information Protection Act of 1995 to protect the privacy of 
citizen from unauthorized data collection and leakage (Greenleaf 2011). Additionally, Act on Promotion of 
Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection of 2001 (or Data 
Protection Act) mandates entities, which use computer and network to process personal data for profit, to 
safeguard personal data for preventing data breaches (Greenleaf 2011). These regulations impose heavy 
regulatory pressures on South Korean banks. 
3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Competing Values Framework (CVF) 
Organizational culture constitutes (1) a socio-structural system defined by perceived operation of 
organizational structures, strategies, policies and management procedures, (2) a cultural system 
incorporating organization’s myths, values, and ideology; and (3) the legacies, experience, and personality 
of individual actors (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984). Organizational culture also refers to taken-for-granted 
values and assumptions in organizations, representing a collective set of expectations, definition and 
memories in the organizational setting (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). That is, organizational culture 
represents an implicit, internal social systems that exudes its influences on organizational practices, 
management strategic planning, and employee’s behavior. As a result, organizational behavior, decision 
making, and employee’s daily operations align with organizational culture. 
A prior study suggested that organizational culture is shaped by human systems that are inherently fraught 
with competing tensions (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983). In particular, Competing Values Framework (CVF) 
investigates organizational culture by suggesting that conflicting tensions can be used to uncover “the basic 
assumptions that are made about such things as the means to compliance, motive, leadership, decision 
making, effectiveness, values, and organizational forms” (Quinn and Kimberly 1984, pg. 298).  Therefore, 
this study adopts organizational culture as a predictor for ISP compliance. 
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Particularly, the concept of competing tensions is represented by (1) one dimension of flexibility vs. stability 
and control in which organizations will tilt toward either flexibility for changes or stability to retain control; 
and (2) another dimension of internal focus vs. external focus in which organizations will prefer either 
improving and maintaining existing organization or adapting and interacting with the external environment 
(Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983). The intersections of these two dimensions shape four archetypes, namely, 
hierarchical, rational, entrepreneurial, and team cultures (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983; Denison and 
Spreitzer 1991) in organizational settings. Please refer to Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Cross-Cultural Framework (CVF) (Denison and Spreitzer 1991) 
Focusing on human relations, team culture highlights flexibility and change in the internal organizations 
(Denison and Spreitzer 1991). The core values consisting of trust, belonging, participation, and team work 
propel leaders to act supportively and considerately for developing human potential and promoting 
memberships (Denison and Spreitzer 1991).  
Like team culture, entrepreneurial culture values flexibility and change but its external focus promotes 
growth, resource acquisition, and adaptation to the external environment (Denison and Spreitzer 1991). 
Leaders are entrepreneurial, risk takers and visionary, striving for achieving visibility, legitimacy, and 
external support (Denison and Spreitzer 1991). 
At the end of the spectrum, rational culture emphasizes achieving well-defined objectives through directing 
organizational members to become more competitive and successful (Denison and Spreitzer 1991). Leaders 
are very goal-oriented, directive, and effective to facilitate high productivity and efficiency for winning the 
market competition (Denison and Spreitzer 1991).  
On the other hand, hierarchical culture emphasizes internal efficiency, homogeneity and coordination to 
maintain internal security, control, order, and stability (Denison and Spreitzer 1991). Leaders are 
methodical, conservative, and rule enforcers who exert control to bring order through attentions to technical 
matters (Denison and Spreitzer 1991). 
In organizational context, the moral dimension of compliance embodies social norms and values that 
organizations must fulfill through regulatory compliance (Interligi 2010). Since organizational culture 
subsumes social norms and values (Schein 1984) that define the moral dimension of compliance, we posit 
that organizational culture incorporates norms that shapes policy compliance (Da Veiga and Eloff 2010). 
Accordingly, we posit that organizational culture including team, entrepreneurial, rational, and hierarchical 
cultures drive organizational norms for policy compliance.  
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H1: Team culture drives organizational norms to stay compliant 
H2: Entrepreneurial culture drives organizational norms to stay compliant 
H3: Rational culture drives organizational norms to stay compliant 
H4: Hierarchical culture drives organizational norms to stay compliant 
As stated earlier, organizational culture generates impacts on employee’s behavior (Schein 1984; Allaire 
and Firsirotu, 1984). Therefore, organizational culture affects employee’s behavior for ISP compliance.  
H5: Team culture drives employee to comply  
H6: Entrepreneurial culture drives employee to comply 
H7: Rational culture drives employee to comply 
H8: Hierarchical culture drives employee to comply 
3.2 Information Security Policy Compliance 
Organizational norms refer to informal rules that monitor member’s conduct (Feldman 1984), creating 
powerful and consistent effects on member’s behavior (Hackman 1976). In other words, organizational 
norms entail perceived norms that dictate the right thing to do (Herath and Rao 2009). Perceived norms 
enforce ISP compliance (Johnston and Warkentin 2010), encouraging user to comply. That is, as users 
perceive that complying with ISP is construed as the right thing to do, they will be more willing to comply. 
H9: Organizational norms drive users to comply with ISP 
 
Figure 2. Proposed Research Model 
Based on the proposed model (figure 2), we formed an online survey using 7-points Likert scales with 1 for 
strongly disagree, 4 for neutral, and 7 for strongly agree. We adopted measurement items from the prior 
studies (Helfrich, Li, Mohr, Meterko and Sales 2007; Herath and Rao 2009; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and 
Benbasat 2010). First, we ran a pilot study by sending out online survey to the banking employees in the 
Midwest of the United States. After two months, we got 51 responses (N=51). Upon reviewing feedback 
from the banking participants, we modified our measurement items. Finally, our measurement items consist 
of 6 reflective constructs, namely, team culture (TEAM), entrepreneurial culture (ENT), rational culture 
(RAT), hierarchical culture (HIE), organizational norms, and user’s ISP compliance (POL). See Table 1. 
Measurement Items with 6 Reflective Constructs 
Construct Measurement Items Reference 
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TEAM TEAM1 Managers in my organization are warm and caring. They seek to develop 
employees' full potential and act as their mentors or guides. 
Helfrich et al. 
2007 
TEAM2 My organization emphasizes human resources. High cohesion and morale 
in the organization are important. 
TEAM 3 The glue that holds my organization together is loyalty and tradition. 
Commitment to this organization runs high. 
ENT ENT1 My organization is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial place. People are 
willing to stick their necks out and take risks. 
ENT2 Managers in my organization are risk-takers. They encourage employees 
to take risks and be innovative. 
RAT RAT1 My organization emphasizes competitive actions and achievement. 
Measurable goals are important. 
RAT2 The glue that holds my organization together is the emphasis on tasks and 
goal accomplishment. A production orientation is commonly shared. 
HIE HIE1 My organization is a very formalized and structured place. Bureaucratic 
procedures generally govern what people do. 
HIE2 Managers in my organization are rule-enforcers. They expect employees 
to follow established rules, policies, and procedures. 
HIE3 The glue that holds my organization together is formal rules and policies. 
People feel that following the rules is important. 
NORM NORM1 Top management thinks I should follow ISP. Herath and 
Rao 2009 NORM2 My boss thinks that I should follow ISP. 
NORM3 My colleagues think that I should follow ISP. 




POL2 I protect information and technology resources according to the 
requirements of the ISP of my organization. 
POL3 I carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization 
when I use information and technology. 
Table 1. Measurement Items 
3.3 Data Collection 
We sent out the online survey to the target audience in the banking industry in the United States and South 
Korea. Basically, we sent the online questionnaires to the banking employees working in the community 
and commerce banks in the United States and paper surveys (translated from English to Korean) to the 
banking employees working in the national banks in South Korea. After ten months, we received 127 
responses from the participants in United States (N=127) and 121 responses from South Korea (N=121).  
The banking participants in the United States came from the east coast (23%), Midwest (40%), south (31%), 
and west coast (15%). On the other hand, most of the participants in South Korea were from Seoul (65%) 
and Busan (35%). All the participants have attained at least a bachelor degree. Additionally, in each sample, 
a majority of participants were born and raised in the nation. For the banking participants in the United 
States, almost everyone grew up in the United States speaking English as their first language. Similarly, all 
the participants from South Korea were born and raised in South Korea and they have been living and 
working in the country throughout their lives. 
The average age of banking participants is 45 year old in the United States and 37 year old in South Korea. 
In each data sample, 60% of participants is female and 40% is male.  Among the banking participants in the 
United States, there are participants working as top management (12%), account manager (9%), compliance 
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officer (6%), middle management (35%), system design and administration (3%), IT support staff (3%), 
clerical staff (12%), and other (20%). However, 74% of participants from South Korea are working as IT 
support staff, 18% as clerical staff, and the rest (8%) are in managerial position.  
3.4 Construct Validity and Reliability 
SmartPLS 3.0 software supports component-based path modelling (Vance, Elie-Dit-Cosaque, and Straub 
2008), enabling us to work with small sample size (Chin 1998; Haenlein and Kaplan 2004; Henseler, Ringle 
and Sinkovics 2009; Marcoulides, Chin, and Sauders 2009). Particularly, the component-based Partial Least 
Squares (PLS) path modelling has the ability to operate with a sample size as small as 50 (Chin 1999). This 
is in contrast to the covariance-based Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) that requires a sample size over 
100 observations (Nasse and Wisenbaker 2003). At this moment, we managed to collect banking data from 
the banking employees in the United States (N=127) and in the South Korea (N=121). The sample size from 
each country is relatively small, thus making PLS a desirable choice. 
Additionally, PLS is a preferable choice to work with non-normal data (Marcoulides, Chin, and Sauders 
2009). Since the banking industry is under tremendous pressure to comply with regulations, we expected 
that the data we received would be skewed, especially for dependent variables including organizational 
norms (NORM) and user compliance (POL). This is another reason we went with PLS.  
Construct Validity and Reliability: United States vs. South Korea 
Construct 









TEAM 0.844 0.842 0.915 0.785 0.732 0.880 
ENT 0.748 0.841 0.897 0.678 0.769 0.861 
RAT 0.807 0.777 0.893 0.800 0.750 0.889 
HIE 0.772 0.861 0.910 0.682 0.777 0.866 
NORM 0.864 0.920 0.950 0.834 0.900 0.938 
POL 0.981 0.990 0.994 0.895 0.941 0.962 
Table 2. Results of Hypotheses Testing 
The Cronbach’s Alpha and composite reliability for each construct in both the United States and South 
Korea samples are larger than 0.7 (see Table 2), thus displaying construct reliability (Fornell and Larcker 
1981; Chin 1998). Since Table 2 shows that the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each construct 
exceeds 0.5 in both samples, this study attains convergence validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981).  
Table 3 and 4 show that the correlation values between a construct with all the corresponding constructs are 
less than the square root of the AVE for the particular construct. This proves discriminant validity (Chin 
1998) for all the constructs in both the USA and South Korea samples. 
Discriminant Validity (USA Sample) 
 ENT HIE NORM POL RAT TEAM 
ENT 0.865      
HIE -0.336 0.879     
NORM 0.114 0.139 0.930    
POL 0.080 0.072 0.648 0.991   
RAT 0.554 -0.126 0.253 0.187 0.898  
TEAM 0.622 -0.235 0.030 0.049 0.678 0.918 
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Table 3. Discriminant Validity of the Constructs (Square Root of AVE in Shaded Cells) 
Discriminant Validity (South Korea Sample) 
 ENT HIE NORM POL RAT TEAM 
ENT 0.823      
HIE 0.651 0.826     
NORM 0.311 0.627 0.913    
POL 0.213 0.566 0.736 0.946   
RAT 0.404 0.623 0.617 0.638 0.894  
TEAM 0.634 0.688 0.366 0.401 0.444 0.886 
Table 4. Discriminant Validity of the Constructs (Square Root of AVE in Shaded Cells) 
3.5 Hypotheses Testing 
Adopting the bootstrapping technique with 500 random re-samples (Mathieson, Peacock, and Chin 2001; 
White, Varadarajan, and Dacin 2003), this study calculated the path coefficients (β) of the structure model. 
Table 5 displays the results of hypotheses testing. The R-Square values for Organizational Norm (NORM) 
and User Compliance (POL) are 10.5% and 42.3%, respectively, for the United States and 47.0% and 61.1% 
for South Korea. 
Results of Hypotheses Testing: United States vs. South Korea 
Hypotheses 
United States South Korea 
  β t-Value Supported β t-Value Supported 
H1: TEAM  NORM -0.136 1.221 No 0.033 0.486 No 
H2: ENT  NORM 0.097 1.064 No -0.132 1.334 No 
H3: RAT  NORM 0.314 ***2.685  Yes 0.332 **2.106 Yes 
H4: HIE  NORM 0.187 **2.172 Yes 0.471 ****3.384 Yes 
H5: TEAM  POL 0.006 0.099   No 0.179 **2.035 Yes 
H6: ENT  POL -0.029 0.518   No -0.236 **2.372 Yes 
H7: RAT  POL 0.032 0.563   No 0.203 **2.316 Yes 
H8: HIE  POL -0.023 0.524   No 0.120 1.597 No 
H9: NORM  POL 0.648 ****10.856 Yes 0.534 ****5.393   Yes 
**p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01    ****p-value < 0.001 
Table 5. Results of Hypotheses Testing 
Total Effects on Dependent Variables (NORM and POL) 
 
United States South Korea 
NORM POL NORM POL 
ENT 0.097 0.034 -0.132 ***-0.306 
HIE **0.187 0.098 ****0.471 ***0.372 
NORM  ****0.648  ****0.534 
RAT ***0.314 **0.236 **0.332 ***0.381 
TEAM -0.136 -0.082 0.033 *0.196 
*p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01    ****p-value < 0.001 
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Table 6. Total Effects 
Indirect Effects on Dependent Variable (POL) 
 
United States South Korea 
POL POL 
ENT 0.063 -0.070 
HIE *0.121 ***0.252 
RAT **0.204 **0.178 
TEAM -0.088 0.018 
*p-value < 0.10 **p-value < 0.05 ***p-value < 0.01    ****p-value < 0.001 
Table 7. Indirect Effects 
4 Discussion 
Analysis results demonstrate that organizational cultures cultivate organizational norms supporting 
Information Security Policy (ISP) compliance in the banking industries of the United States and South 
Korea. Consistent with the prior studies (Herath and Rao 2009; Johnston and Warkentin 2010), 
organizational norms drive banking employees in both nations to comply.  
The R-Square values for organizational norms (NORM) differ between the United States (10.5%) and South 
Korea (47%). This suggests that, in South Korea, organizational culture in banks is more influential in 
shaping organizational norms for ISP compliance than that of the United States. The main reason is that 
hierarchical culture exerts greater impact on organizational norms in the banking of South Korea (total effect 
= 0.471, p < 0.001) than on those of the United States (total effect =0.187, p < 0.05).  
Specifically, hierarchical culture shapes organizational norms favoring ISP compliance in the banking 
industry in both nations (β=0.187, p < 0.05 for USA and β=0.471, p < 0.001 for South Korea). In general, 
hierarchical culture encourages internal control, order, and rule enforcement (Denison and Spreitzer 1991). 
This suggests that hierarchical culture facilitates top-down management that enforces policies (Hu, Dine, 
Hart and Cooke 2012), creating organization norms for ISP compliance (Smith, Winchester, Bunker and 
Jamieson 2010). 
Hierarchical culture generates much stronger impact on the organizational norms in banks of South Korea 
than on those of the United States because South Korea has a national culture of high power distance 
(Hofstede 1983). Mainly, high power distance requires subordinates deferring to superiors in decision 
making (Hofstede 1983), thus giving superiors more power. In this respect, high power distance augments 
hierarchical culture by granting management higher power and control. As a result, top-down management 
can be carried out effectively to cultivate organizational norms for ISP compliance. Conversely, the national 
culture of low power distance in the United States is not as effective in enhancing hierarchical culture as the 
national culture of high power distance in South Korea. This explains as to why hierarchical culture in banks 
of the United States generates smaller effect on organizational norms favoring ISP compliance. 
Additionally, rational culture in organizations constructs organizational norms for ISP compliance in both 
nations (β= 0.314, p < 0.01 for USA and β=0.332, p < 0.05 for South Korea).  In the banking industry, 
failing to comply will result in fines and even bad reputation that will negatively affect a bank’s revenue. 
To stay competitive, banks must attain compliance. Since rational culture emphasizes organizational 
competitiveness (Denison and Spreitzer 1991), we assert that rational culture pinpoints security policies to 
protect organizations for the purpose of sustaining market competition. Gradually, rational culture develops 
organizational norms for ISP compliance.  
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However, in the banking industry of both nations, entrepreneurial culture does not have any direct effects 
on shaping organizational norms in favor of ISP compliance. As stated earlier, banking is a highly regulated 
industry in that it is an institution that has to confront regulatory pressures imposed by authorized and 
legitimate parties (Kam, Katerattanakul and Gogolin 2013). This does not blend well with entrepreneurial 
culture wherein its core values lie within promoting flexibility, creativity, and growth rather than fostering 
internal control for organizational stability (Denison and Spreitzer 1991). That is, entrepreneurial culture 
nurtures an “open” organizational environment favoring creativity and risk-taking as opposed to shaping a 
more restrictive environment for ISP compliance. 
In the same token, team culture displays no direct impact on constructing organizational norms for ISP 
compliance in both nations. This is mainly because team culture fosters leaderships favoring mutual 
understanding and human relation to promote morale and group cohesion (Denison and Spreitzer 1991). In 
other words, team culture cultivates a “clan” environment (Zammuto and O’Connor 1992) in that 
maintaining human relationships is more important than penalizing employees who fail to comply. 
The main distinction between the banking industry in the United States and South Korea is that 
organizational culture of banks in the United States does not show any direct impacts on employee’s 
compliance. However, team, rational and entrepreneurial cultures in South Korean banks directly affect 
employee’s effort to comply.  
Drawing on the American culture of low uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede 1983), we assert that risk-taking 
and innovation facilitated by entrepreneurial culture (Denison and Spreitzer 1991) coordinates with low 
uncertainty avoidance that promotes embracing the unknown (Hofstede 1983).  In other words, low 
uncertainty avoidance blends well with risk-taking supported by entrepreneurial culture to encourage 
individuals to take risk for creating innovative ideas rather than following some restrictions to stay 
compliant. Hence, entrepreneurial culture does not drive individuals to comply in banks of the United States. 
Nevertheless, nations with high uncertainty avoidance, such as South Korea, tend to espouse well-defined 
rules and eschew risk (Hofstede 1983). We maintain that entrepreneurial culture that encourages risk-taking 
and creativity (Denison and Spreitzer 1991) collides with South Korean’s culture of high uncertainty 
avoidance. This is mainly because flexibility and risk-taking advocated by entrepreneurial culture has a 
negative effect on implementing well-defined, rigid rules embraced by a national culture of high uncertainty 
avoidance.  Accordingly, this explains as to why entrepreneurial culture perpetuates negative impacts on 
employee’s compliance in South Korean banking (β= -0.236, p <0.05). 
In the United States, team culture advocating loyalty to organizations (Zammuto and O’Connor 1992) does 
not fit well into American culture of individualism that values personal welfare over loyalty to organizations. 
As a result, team culture does not directly promote employee’s effort of achieving compliance in banks of 
the United States. However, by promoting group affiliation, team culture reinforces collectivism, which is 
a part of the national culture in South Korea (Hofstede 1983). Therefore, banking employees in South Korea 
are obliged to comply with ISP due to their loyalty to and identification with their organizations. This thus 
produces a direct impact on employee’s efforts of staying compliant (β=0.179, p <0.05). 
Furthermore, rational culture exhibits positive effect on employee’s effort of staying compliant in the banks 
of South Korea (β=0.203, p <0.05). Rational culture drives individuals to comply because it reinforces South 
Korean’s culture of high power distance and masculinity. Since rational culture is control-oriented, national 
culture of high power distance makes it acceptable for top management to dictate employee’s behavior and 
coerce employees to comply with ISP.  Additionally, the success-focused masculinity complements rational 
culture that stresses success and achievement. In the banking industry, doing a good job entails staying 
compliant. Hence, employees will comply with ISP in order to be perceived as a competent worker and to 
be considered in the next job promotion. 
Nevertheless, in the banking industry of the United States, rational culture does not demonstrate any direct 
impacts on employee’s compliance. Supposedly, American culture of masculinity (Hofstede 1983) 
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synchronizes with the achievement-oriented aspect of rational culture that propels employees to comply. 
But we maintain that masculinity is countered by another elements of national culture incorporating 
individualism and low power distance. As individuals highly value their personal welfare and freedom, 
control mechanisms that restrict individual’s behavior may not appeal to individuals. Furthermore, in the 
context of low power distance, employees appreciate equality, and therefore, stricter authority that imposes 
tighter control and coercive force may be a turn-off to employees. This explains as to why rational culture 
that focuses on control (Denison and Spreitzer 1991) does not synchronize with high individualism and low 
power distance, thereby generating no direct impact on employee’s compliance in the banks of USA. 
Interestingly, hierarchical culture does not have any direct effects on employee’s effort of staying compliant 
in the banking industries of the United States and South Korea. On the basis that hierarchical culture 
cultivates organizational norms for ISP compliance in banks of both nations, we assert that hierarchical 
culture plays a more prominent role in organizational settings rather that in individual’s efforts of staying 
compliant. In hierarchical culture, cautious and conservative leadership attempts to protect organizational 
welfare by mandating employees to abide by rules (Zammuto and O’Connor 1992). This suggests that 
emphasis on strict rules and regulations stresses organizational operation but ignores employee’s well-being. 
That is, restriction and control on individuals do not synchronize with American culture of individualism. 
Accordingly, hierarchical culture has no direct impact on employee’s compliance in the American banks. 
While the national culture of South Korea values low individualism and high collectivism (Hofstede 1983), 
hierarchical culture based on bureaucracy (Zammuto and O’Connor 1992) lacks a “human” perspective. 
This makes it hard for employees to identify with organizations and subsequently creates difficulties to 
harness the power of collectivism built on group affiliation. In other words, hierarchical culture does not 
display any direct impact on employee’s compliance in South Korean banks because its bureaucratic nature 
fails to build human relations; and as a result, hierarchical culture does not complement collectivism that 
encourages individual compliance through group affiliation.  
Additionally, in both nations, hierarchical culture shows indirect effects on employee’s compliance in the 
banking industries in both nations (indirect effect = 0.121, p < 0.10 for USA and indirect effect = 0.252, p 
< 0.01 for South Korea). Alternatively, hierarchical culture indirectly drives banking employees to comply 
through organizational norms. Rational culture also has an indirect effect on employee’s effort of staying 
compliant (indirect effect = 0.204, p < 0.05 for USA and indirect effect = 0.178, p < 0.05 for South Korea). 
That is, rational culture fosters organizational norms supporting ISP compliance, which, in turn, generates 
mediating effects on employee’s effort of staying compliant. These indirect effects corroborate with the 
notion that organizational culture shapes organizational norms (Schein 1984) that later drive employee’s 
compliance (Herath and Rao 2009). 
Finally, the following table summarizes the research findings in this study. 
Summary of Research Findings 
Research Findings United States South Korea Reasoning 
Types of organizational culture 
that support organizational 
norms for ISP compliance 
Hierarchical and 
rational cultures 
Hierarchical and  
rational cultures 
The common industry characteristics, 
such as, hierarchical structure and 
market competition, may reflect upon 
organizational cultures. These 
characteristics support organizational-
level compliance. 
Types of organizational culture 
that do not support 








Entrepreneurial culture cultivates an 
“open” environment for innovation and 
team culture fosters human relations. 
Both cultures do not align with industry 
characteristics (e.g. hierarchical).  
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Overall impacts of 
organizational culture on 
organizational norms 







NORM is 47%) 
South Korean’s culture of high power 
distance augments hierarchical culture 
to enable top-down management that 
creates internal norms for ISP 
compliance. But the American culture 
of low power distance does not.  
Types of organizational 
cultures that support 
individual’s efforts of staying 
compliant 
None  Entrepreneurial 
culture (negative 
impact) 
Collides with high uncertain avoidance 
in South Korea; risk-taking aspect of 
entrepreneurial culture does not favor 
stricter control for compliance. 
Team culture Reinforces collectivism in South Korea 
but does not coordinate with high 
individualism in USA 
Rational culture Reinforces masculinity and high power 
distance in South Korea but the control-
oriented rational culture collides with 
low power distance in USA 
Do organization norms support 
individual compliance? 
Yes Yes Consistent with the findings of prior 
studies (Herath and Rao 2009) 
Table 8. Summary of Research Findings 
5 Conclusion, Research Implications and Limitations 
In summary, the main differences of Information Security Policy (ISP) compliance in the banking industry 
between the United States and South Korea are: (1) organizational culture does not have any direct impact 
on employee’s compliance in the banks of United States but exhibits some effects on the banking employees 
in South Korea; and (2) organizational cultures (hierarchical and rational cultures) in South Korean banks 
are more influential in shaping organizational norms supporting ISP compliance than those of the banks in 
the United States.  
On the other hand, the banking industries in both nations share some similarities in that organizational 
cultures, namely, hierarchical and rational cultures, build organizational norms in support of ISP 
compliance. Additionally, hierarchical and rational cultures have indirect mediating effects on employee’s 
efforts of staying compliant in the banking industries of both nations. 
By drawing similarities and differences between the banking industries in both nations, this study 
contributes to the research findings by presenting ISP compliance at the organizational (macro) and 
individual (micro) levels. First of all, this study infers that industry characteristics of banking influence the 
organizational norms (macro) for ISP compliance. For example, hierarchical culture in the organizational 
settings can be attributed to the hierarchical and bureaucratic nature (Davis 2004) of the banking industry. 
Overall, hierarchical culture directly shapes organizational norms for ISP compliance in banks of the United 
States and South Korea. 
Similarly, rational culture can be ascribed to the profit-oriented and competitive nature of the banking 
industry. Since banks rely heavily on data for decision making (Yeh and Chang 2007), policy compliance 
may help banks to assure data integrity for good decision making. In other words, the accomplishment-
oriented aspect of rational culture drives banks to make good decision built on data integrity, and therefore, 
banks must safeguard data integrity to support decision making that will lead to winning the market 
competition. Accordingly, rational culture motivates banks to shape organizational norms supporting ISP 
compliance in the banking industries of both nations.  
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Second, for ISP compliance at the individual (micro) level, this study infers that national culture has some 
moderating effects on individual’s compliance. This study suggests that individuals will incline to exercise 
compliance if national culture ingrained on individuals reinforces organizational culture. Conversely, 
organizational culture that collides with national culture may negatively affect employee’s compliance.  
5.1 Theoretical and Practical Implications  
Drawing on the conclusion above, this study suggests that there is an interplay between national culture and 
organizational culture in term of ISP compliance. The interactive effect is mainly applicable to ISP 
compliance at the individual (micro) level. That is, organizational culture contrasting national culture may 
be ineffective in promoting employee’s compliance and vice versa.  
Next, we posit that industry characteristics may have some impacts on organizational norms (macro level) 
for ISP compliance. Drawing on the Neo-Institutional Theory (NIT), industry is an institution that 
encourages and/or restricts organizational actions and behavior; and as a consequence, organizations have 
to adapt to the institutional framework in order to survive (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowen 
1977). Mainly, NIT suggests organizations survive by replicating mechanisms that have been proven 
successful to adapt to the external environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowen 1977). For 
instance, as shown in the analysis results, rational and hierarchical cultures in organizations are more 
effective in shaping organizational norms supporting ISP compliance, and therefore, most banks may 
employ these cultures. This is reflected upon the hierarchical, bureaucratic, and competitive nature (Davis 
2004) of the banking industry. Consequently, this suggests that industry characteristics may transcend 
national boundaries and play a key role in policy compliance. 
In this respect, we further suggest that there is a three-way interaction among organizational, national, and 
industry cultures for ISP compliance at the individual-level. A future research can be conducted to examine 
these interactive effects by examining ISP compliance in multiple industries of multiple nations. 
As for practical implications, this study suggests that international branches of banking organizations should 
incorporate local culture to promote ISP compliance.  For instance, a U.S. bank located at South Korea can 
exert more managerial controls to encourage employees to comply because South Korean’s culture of high 
power distance (Hofstede 1983) supports tighter management scrutiny.   
Drawing on the analysis results, hierarchical culture directly creates organizational norms for ISP 
compliance but it does not directly drive individual’s efforts of staying compliant. Rather than enforcing 
rigid rules with coercive force, we suggest that banks should foster understanding among employees when 
promoting ISP compliance. For example, banks can organize informal sessions to discuss about security 
policies and build human relations to encourage employee’s participation in ISP compliance. Having face-
to-face communication will not only establish relationships but also convey the importance of security 
policies. This may be a better way to increase employee’s willingness to comply in comparison to coercing 
employee’s compliance through pressures imposed by management. 
5.2 Limitation 
Finally, this study is not without limitation. First of all, due to the difficulties of data collection, our sample 
sizes are relatively small (N=127 for the United States and N=121 for South Korea). Additionally, this study 
only selects one industry and does not conduct a cross-industry study to draw comparison in ISP compliance. 
Therefore, the findings are mostly applicable in highly regulated industries. Researchers may want to 
exercise caution when referencing the research findings. 
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